Physical storage: paper, metal & places
Your backup must outlive fire, flood, damp, curious relatives, burglars and decades of neglect, and still be readable by you and your heirs. This page sets out the evidence on what survives, where to keep it, and how to combine physical backups with passphrases, SLIP-39 and multisig. It is educational information, not advice.
At a glance: physical storage in six points Beginner
- Paper is a starting point, not a destination. It burns, soaks and fades. Fine for a first copy while you set things up; move to metal for meaningful sums.
- Choose stainless steel or titanium, with the characters punched or stamped in. In independent tests, simple one-piece plates did best; loose-tile designs failed more often (evidence).
- Avoid aluminium, brass, copper and zinc for the part that carries your words. Their melting points are at or below the temperatures reached in house fires and in test torches (table).
- Metal does not stop thieves. Anyone who finds a plain seed backup can take your funds. Hiding it well, sealing it in a tamper-evident bag, and (for larger sums) a passphrase, SLIP-39 or multisig deal with that.
- Two copies, two places. One fire, flood or burglary should not wipe out every copy. But each extra copy is another thing to steal, which is why splitting schemes exist (location strategy).
- Check it, then check it again. Verify each copy with your wallet's "check backup" feature before you rely on it, and look at stored copies on a schedule (maintenance). Make sure someone you trust will be able to find and use it (estate planning).
What can destroy a backup?
| Threat | Typical conditions | Paper | Stainless steel / titanium |
|---|---|---|---|
| House fire | Over 400 °C at the start of flashover; about 1,000 °C in a room undergoing flashover (NIST) | Destroyed | Generally survives (stainless steel melts at about 1,375–1,450 °C; titanium at about 1,670 °C) |
| Flood / firefighting water | Immersion, mud, days to weeks | Ink runs, pulp, mould | Survives; avoid mixed metals (galvanic corrosion) |
| Crush (building collapse) | Tonnes of force | Survives but may tear | Depends on design — tile cassettes can scatter |
| Corrosion / damp | Years in a cellar or garage | Fades, mould | 304/316 stainless and titanium resist well |
| Theft / discovery | Burglar, guest, cleaner | Same risk for both — readable by anyone who finds it | |
Melting-point note: aluminium (about 660 °C) and brass (about 916–954 °C) can fail in house fires; prefer stainless steel or titanium. Figures and sources are in the materials table.
Threat matrix: what protects against what Intermediate
No single choice covers every threat. Material choice deals with the physical threats at the top; location and design deal with people. "Design" means how the secret is split, for example a passphrase, SLIP-39 shares or multisig.
| Threat | Paper | Good metal (one-piece steel/titanium) | Location helps? | Design helps? | Main defence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| House fire | Destroyed | Survives in tests | A fire-rated safe adds time; a second site adds a copy | Only via redundancy | Metal, plus a copy elsewhere |
| Flood / firefighting water | Ink runs, pulp, mould | Survives | Store off the floor; sealed bags | Only via redundancy | Metal; avoid mixed metals |
| Crush / collapse | Tears but may survive | Depends on design: tiles can spill, tubes can seize | Some | Only via redundancy | One-piece, thick plates |
| Damp, corrosion, decay | Fades, mould | 304/316 steel and titanium resist well | Dry, stable place | No | Material; periodic checks |
| Lost after a disaster | Yes | Yes: washed away, picked up, site condemned | Second site | Thresholds tolerate a missing part | Geographic separation |
| Burglar or snooping guest | Readable | Readable | Hiding, safes, off-site | One piece is useless alone | Passphrase, SLIP-39 or multisig |
| "$5 wrench" coercion | No help | No help | Keys not all at home | Keys you cannot reach quickly | Privacy, separation, multisig |
| Inheritance loss | Heirs may not find it | Heirs may not find or decode it | Known, accessible sites | More parts can mean more confusion | Letter of instruction, labels, tests |
| Your own mistakes | Easy to fix | Punched errors are permanent | No | Complexity can add errors | Verify with the device before relying on it |
| Institution fails you | Same for both: bank box closed, contents passed to the state, or a vault raided | Spread across providers | No single box holds enough | Never one box for everything | |
Sources: stress-test results from Lopp's metal storage reviews; post-fire retrieval risks from Lopp's How to Back Up a Seed Phrase; institutional risks in safe deposit boxes below.
Materials compared Beginner Intermediate
Melting point is not the only thing that matters. Corrosion, how deep the characters go, and how many separate parts can fall apart matter as much. Melting points are rounded; alloys melt over a range.
| Material / format | Melting point | Corrosion and decay | Main failure modes | Independent test evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paper (pen or pencil) | Burns, no melting point. Fire safes for paper keep the inside below 177 °C (UL Class 350) or 170 °C (EN 15659) | Fades, soaks, moulds | Fire, water, being thrown away | Owners' reports of flood and fire losses (below) |
| Laminated paper | Plastic film gives no fire protection | Keeps splashes off, but conservators say heat-seal lamination is irreversible and its adhesives can damage paper and ink over time | Fire; damage from the laminate itself | University of Illinois PSAP: "lamination should never be thought of as a preservation method" |
| Stainless steel 304 | About 1,400–1,450 °C | Good; austenitic grades resist corrosion best | Shallow etching or ink templates lost; fasteners seize | Many A-grade plates and washers (table) |
| Stainless steel 316 / 316L | About 1,375–1,400 °C | Better against chlorides (salt); 316L's lower carbon helps where marks have deformed the surface | As 304 | Lopp's recommended grade for new designs |
| Titanium (grade 4 or 7) | About 1,670 °C | Very good | Engraved (not stamped) words were lost in heat on one plate; titanium galls with itself, and steel fasteners can corrode galvanically against it | CryptoTag Zeus, Odin and Thor graded A; ImpressSeed Titanium A−; ColdTI C (heat D) |
| Copper sheet | About 1,085 °C (pure copper) | Pitted and disintegrated in the acid test | Thin sheet; light impressions | Copper Seed Safe C− (crush F) |
| Brass | About 916–954 °C (cartridge brass) | Not covered by the tests cited here | Can soften or melt in a severe fire | Lopp recommends only stainless steel or titanium |
| Aluminium | About 660 °C | Not covered by the tests cited here | Melts in house-fire conditions | The aluminium case of one tested capsule melted quickly (its tungsten rings survived) |
| Zinc (and zinc die-cast) | About 420 °C | Not covered by the tests cited here | Melts early | Lopp recommends only stainless steel or titanium |
Sources: stainless grades, titanium grades, galling and galvanic corrosion from Lopp's Treatise on Bitcoin Seed Backup Device Design (2022); element melting points from the Royal Society of Chemistry: titanium 1,670 °C, copper 1,084.62 °C, aluminium 660.32 °C, zinc 419.53 °C; cartridge brass C26000 solidus 916 °C, liquidus 954 °C (AZoM); grades from Lopp's table, including the Copper Seed Safe and Keyois Capsule reviews.
Formats compared
| Format | How you record words | Tools | Strengths | Weaknesses | Typical grades |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centre-punched plate | Dots on a printed or etched letter grid (first four letters) | Centre punch (often included), hammer | One piece; easy to re-strike a light dot | Template must be deep, or the dots become meaningless | Mostly A |
| Letter-stamped plate or tag | Letter punches struck with a hammer | Letter punch set, hammer, jig | Human-readable; no template needed | Slow and error-prone: missed strikes, rotated letters | Mostly A |
| Washer stack | Stamped washers on a bolt | Letter punches; washers, bolt and nut | Cheap, generic parts | Order must be stamped on each washer; fasteners can seize | A (Steel Wallet, DIY and commercial) |
| Tile capsule | Letter tiles threaded on a rod inside a tube | None | Tool-free; enclosed tiles | A bent tube can be impossible to unscrew; tiles can spill when cut open | A− (Cryptosteel Capsule, crush B) |
| Tile cassette or tablet | Loose letter tiles in rails or slots | None or a screwdriver | Quick and tool-free | Heat or crushing warps the rails and tiles fall out | B to C (Billfodl C, Keystone Tablet Plus C, Cryptosteel Cassette B) |
| Engraved or etched | Electric engraver, electrolysis etching or factory laser | Engraver or etching kit | Neat | Shallow marks can fade in heat or acid; a vendor who engraves for you sees your words | Varies |
Paper, lamination and stone paper Beginner
Pros
- Free, immediate, easy to read
- Fine as a temporary or secondary copy
Cons
- Burns, soaks, fades, gets thrown away
- Lamination/stone paper add water resistance but not fire resistance
Real-world failures
- "The flood took my Bitcoins" (r/Bitcoin)
- Water-damaged paper wallet (r/Bitcoin)
- Device and paper lost in a fire (r/ledgerwallet)
- House fire survivor whose device outlived the paper (r/Bitcoin)
Advice
- Pencil or archival pigment ink; block capitals
- Seal in a zip bag; store away from the device
- Never print from a computer (printer memory, spoolers, networked printers)
- Upgrade to metal for meaningful sums
On lamination: the University of Illinois Preservation Self-Assessment Program describes heat-seal lamination as irreversible, and says laminate plastics can "off-gas" and their adhesives can make inks bleed (PSAP). If you want a paper copy kept dry, a resealable plastic bag (as the FDIC suggests for safe-deposit contents) can be opened and checked; lamination cannot.
Metal backups: types and test evidence Beginner
Independent stress tests by Bitcoin security engineer Jameson Lopp — propane torch (1,093 °C), acid bath, and a 20-ton hydraulic press — have covered 75 devices. His published conclusion: simple single plates with centre-punched or stamped characters are generally the best value; multi-part tile designs have more ways to fail (reviews, round III write-up).
| Design | Examples (not endorsements) | Pros | Cons / pitfalls | Indicative test results* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centre-punched plate (dot grid) | Blockplate, SEEDPLATE, CRYO, BitBox Steelwallet | Very robust, cheap, one piece | Need a centre punch; learn the grid; mistakes permanent | A grades common |
| Letter-stamped plate / tag | Cryptotag (titanium), DIY steel plates | Robust, human-readable | Letter punch set; practice needed; noisy | A grades common |
| Stamped washers on a bolt | DIY 304/316 washers | Cheap, compact, robust | Order must be preserved (number each) | Strong in tests |
| Letter-tile capsule | Cryptosteel Capsule / Seed24 | No tools, enclosed tiles | Many small parts; crush can deform | A− (original Capsule) |
| Letter-tile cassette / card | Billfodl, Keystone Tablet Plus | Tool-free, quick | Tiles may fall out after heat/crush; some failed heat | C grades for these two |
| Engraved / etched plate | Various; DIY engraving | Neat appearance | Shallow etches can be lost to heat/corrosion; never use laser shops (they see your words) | Varies |
| SLIP-39 share plates | Trezor Keep Metal | Sized for 20-word shares | Not in Lopp's published list at time of review | Not tested |
*Grades from Lopp's public table (checked October 2026). Products are redesigned; tested units may differ from current ones. Verify before buying.
Pros of metal
- Survives typical fires and floods
- Decades-long durability
Cons
- Cost (£20–£150+)
- Still readable by a thief
- Mistakes hard to fix
Common pitfalls
- Buying "seed backup" products that come with words pre-stamped or ask you to send them your words (scam)
- Ordering custom engraving online — the vendor sees your seed
- Mixing metals (galvanic corrosion) or using aluminium/brass
- Not verifying the metal copy against the device
Advice
- Buy plain, generic blanks where possible; nobody needs to know what they are for
- Re-verify each metal copy with a device "check backup" function
- Keep a paper copy too, elsewhere, until the metal is verified
Stress-test evidence: fire, acid and crush Intermediate
The most widely cited public dataset is Jameson Lopp's Metal Bitcoin Seed Storage Reviews, covering 75 devices. His method:
- Heat: a large propane torch giving a 1,093 °C (2,000 °F) flame over 4 inches (about 10 cm) across, checked with a thermometer, for 10 minutes or until failure. Then a plunge into a bucket of water, to simulate firefighters putting the fire out. He notes that failures usually happened around the 5-minute mark.
- Corrosion: 12 hours in 16% muriatic (hydrochloric) acid, or until bubbling stops. He says this is deliberately more extreme than most people will face.
- Crush: a 20-ton hydraulic press, then a check that the data can still be read.
- Grading: A means he could not cause data loss; F means it was easy to destroy. He calls the grading "arbitrary" and the tests "not highly scientific": they rank devices against each other.
| Device | Overall | Heat | Corrosion | Crush | What happened |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blockplate, Bitplate Domino, Codlkeys, Smallseed, Steelwallet | A | A | A | A | Single plates or washers with punched data; Lopp's "best bang for your buck" group |
| Quadrat Register variants | A | A | A | A | The most durable devices he tested |
| CryptoTag Zeus (titanium) | A | A | A | A | No data loss, but parts of the etched template faded in acid |
| Coinplate Grid | A | A | A | A | Data intact, but the fasteners seized after heating; opened only after flattening in the press |
| Steel Wallet (DIY) | A | A | A | A | Homemade plates; no data loss in any test |
| Cryptosteel Capsule | A− | A | A | B | The bent tube could no longer be unscrewed; you would have to cut it open without spilling the tiles |
| Cypherwheel | B+ | A | A | C | Held far more heat than other devices and deformed on rapid cooling; setup can take about an hour |
| Cryptosteel Cassette | B | A | A | D | Some letters fell out in the heat test; rail designs lose letters when deformed |
| Keystone Tablet Punch | B | A | D | A | In acid most template lines and letters disappeared, leaving "noise" that made the real dots very hard to pick out |
| Billfodl | C | C | A | D | Heat warped the tray so letters fell out; crushing released almost all the letters |
| Keystone Tablet Plus | C | F | A | A | Despite extra screws, slots expanded in the heat and tiles were lost |
| ColdTI (titanium) | C | D | C | A | Engraved words were lost where the flame hit and the screw melted; the screws dissolved in acid. Stamped words survived |
| Copper Seed Safe | C− | B | C | F | Thin copper sheet: partial data loss in heat and acid, total failure when crushed |
| Blockstream Metal (discontinued) | D | A | F | – | Failed the corrosion test |
| ELLIPAL Mnemonic Metal | F | F | F | – | Failed heat and corrosion |
Grades copied from Lopp's public table and the linked individual reviews, checked 24 October 2026. Lopp says he will not test many more devices because most new products resemble ones already tested. Products are redesigned, so a tested unit may differ from what is sold today.
- One tester, one sample each. These are informal tests of single units, not certified laboratory results. Treat them as strong evidence about designs, not guarantees about a product.
- Disclosure: Lopp co-founded Casa, a company that sells multisig key-management services. His device reviews do not sell metal plates, but his wider backup advice recommends multisig.
- Maker claims are not test results. Several products that failed had claimed to be "fireproof" (for example, Keystone claimed a "fireproof threshold of 1399 to 1455 °C" for a tablet whose tiles fell out in Lopp's heat test).
What the tests say makes a good device Intermediate
From Lopp's design treatise, written after stress-testing about 70 devices:
- Stainless steel or titanium, ideally 316L stainless steel or grade 4 or 7 titanium. "Don't cheap out and use aluminum unless you want a pile of slag."
- Small but thick. He suggests at least 5 mm of metal, preferably over 1 cm. Long, thin plates flex; large stacks hold heat and can deform when hosed with water.
- One solid piece, with as few fasteners as possible. He has seen fasteners melt, dissolve in acid, strip, or seize a crushed device shut.
- Centre-punched or electrolysis-etched data. He found stamping "arduous" (missed strikes, double strikes, rotated letters), and a light centre-punch strike is easy to redo.
- The decoding template etched as deeply as the data. Printed or lightly etched templates were erased by heat or acid, leaving dots with no meaning.
- Words, not numbers, where space allows. If one character becomes unreadable, four stored letters usually leave about 2 possible words; a stored word number can leave up to 10.
- If you use tiles, one tile per word, numbered. If 96 single-letter tiles get mixed up, there are 96! (about 10150) possible orders.
- Privacy: assume a seller's shipping list will leak. Do not have backup products delivered to the place where you will keep them; hardware-shop DIY avoids the issue.
DIY metal backup — step by step Intermediate
- Buy 304 or 316 stainless washers (e.g. M10, 2–3 mm thick) or a plain plate, a 3 mm letter/number punch set and a hammer from a hardware shop. Pay cash if privacy matters.
- Practise on scrap: strike firmly once, on a solid steel or concrete surface.
- Stamp the word number and the first four letters (e.g. "01 WORD" format), one word per washer or per line.
- Assemble washers on a stainless bolt with a locking nut; optionally secure with a tamper-evident sealed bag.
- Verify against the device; then destroy any scrap pieces that contain real letters.
Lopp's reviews give A grades to DIY designs such as Steel Wallet (DIY) and Bulletproof Bitcoin (DIY). If you buy a kit, makers such as Trezor advise marking the letters first, checking the marked letters with the device's Check backup feature, and only then punching (Trezor Keep Metal guide). That is good practice for any metal backup.
How hot is a house fire? Intermediate
- How common: fire and rescue services in England attended 26,180 dwelling fires in the year to March 2026 (Home Office statistics). The US Fire Administration estimates 344,600 residential building fires in the US in 2023 (USFA).
- How hot: a NIST fact sheet for firefighters gives over 400 °C for gases at the start of room flashover, and about 1,000 °C inside a room undergoing flashover (NIST SP 1102). Lopp's site puts typical house-fire peaks at around 704 °C (why stress test). Temperatures vary greatly with fuel, ventilation and duration, so plan for the higher figure.
- What that means: paper and plastics burn; aluminium (660 °C) and zinc (420 °C) melt; brass and copper are close to their melting range at the top end. Stainless steel and titanium melt well above these temperatures. Lopp's 1,093 °C torch is a little hotter than the NIST flashover figure.
- Surviving is not the same as getting it back. Lopp lists ways a backup that survives can still be lost: fire hoses washing it into run-off, someone sifting the rubble pocketing it, or the site being condemned so only hazmat crews may enter (How to Back Up a Seed Phrase). That is the case for a second location.
Fire safes and what their ratings mean Intermediate
Fire ratings test whether a container keeps its inside cool enough for paper or media for a set time. They do not test whether it stops a burglar, and they do not test immersion in water.
| Standard | Where used | What it tests | Key figures | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UL 72, Class 350 (1-hour or 2-hour) | US | Fire endurance, explosion (sudden heat) and an optional fire-and-impact test (a 30 ft / 9.1 m drop) | Inside must stay below 350 °F (177 °C) while the furnace reaches 1,700 °F (927 °C) for 1 hour, or 1,850 °F (1,010 °C) for 2 hours, including the cool-down in the closed furnace | "Tested to UL standards" is not the same as UL-listed. Classes 150 and 125 are for data media, not paper |
| EN 15659 (LFS 30 P / LFS 60 P) | UK and Europe | Light fire storage for paper, 30 or 60 minutes | Protects paper that survives up to 170 °C | BSI notes that protection after the 30 or 60 minutes of fire is not ensured |
| EN 1047-1 | UK and Europe | Data cabinets: fire endurance plus a fire-shock and impact test | Classes for different contents, including temperature- and humidity-sensitive media | A more demanding test than EN 15659 |
| EN 1143-1 (grades 0 to XIII) | Europe, UK, Ireland | Burglary resistance, not fire | Insurers' cash ratings are set nationally for each grade | Ireland's police warn against grades "assigned" by a maker or seller for marketing rather than certified by an accredited body |
Sources: UL 72 scope (UL Standards & Engagement); American Security: fire ratings explained and KL Security: UL fire rating (manufacturer and dealer summaries of the UL test); BSI Knowledge on BS EN 15659 and BS EN 1047-1; An Garda Síochána: secure safes and standards.
Pros of a rated fire safe
- Buys time for paper and devices inside
- Keeps casual visitors out
- Useful for the hardware wallet and documents, not just the seed
Cons
- Burglars look for safes; small ones can be carried off
- Ratings are time-limited; long fires can exceed them
- All home copies still share one fire, flood and burglary
Pitfalls
- Relying on a fire safe instead of metal: a safe rated for paper is designed for paper, not for every fire
- Unrated "fire-resistant" boxes or document bags with no test standard
- Assuming fire ratings cover floodwater or hose water
- Comparing unlike ratings: some gun-safe ratings (e.g. Intertek ETL tests at 1,200 °F / 649 °C, as one maker describes) are not the same test as UL 72's 1,700 °F furnace
- Not bolting it down
Community advice
- Treat a safe as a layer: metal backup inside, a second copy somewhere else
- Put contents in sealed plastic bags as well (FDIC)
- Look for a third-party certification mark, not a seller's claim
SeedQR and CompactSeedQR Intermediate
Developed by the SeedSigner project (specification). Your BIP39 words are encoded as word-index digits (Standard SeedQR) or raw entropy bits (CompactSeedQR) and drawn by hand onto a printed grid (21×21 or 25×25 for 12 words; 25×25 or 29×29 for 24), or punched onto steel.
Pros
- Fast, error-free entry into air-gapped stateless signers by camera
- Ideal for SeedSigner/Krux/Jade-style "nothing stored" setups
Cons
- As sensitive as the words; anyone with a phone can read it
- Hand-transcription takes 30–60 minutes
Pitfalls
- Scanning with a phone "to test it" — that leaks the seed
- Generating the QR on a computer printer
- No human-readable words kept as fallback
Advice
- Keep the words as well as the QR
- Only ever scan with your air-gapped signer
Encoding tricks (not encryption) Intermediate
- First four letters: enough to identify any English BIP39 word — saves space on metal.
- Word index numbers (1–2048): compact; looks like "just numbers" but is trivially decoded by anyone who knows BIP39.
- Binary/hex of the entropy: compact but error-prone.
Obfuscation and steganography — caveats Expert
People hide words in books, change word order with a "secret rule", add fake words, or shift indices by a memorised number. Community consensus is cautious:
Possible benefit
- A casual finder may not recognise a seed
Cons
- Home-made "encryption" is weak against anyone determined
- Your heirs may never work out the rule
- You may forget it yourself in 10 years
Pitfalls
- Books get donated; furniture gets sold
- Rules based on dates/names are guessable
Advice
- Use a standard BIP39 passphrase or a real splitting scheme (SLIP-39 / multisig) instead — they have been analysed by cryptographers
Where to keep backups Intermediate
| Location | Pros | Cons / pitfalls |
|---|---|---|
| Home safe (fire-rated, bolted down) | Accessible; deters casual theft | Burglars target safes; check fire standard (e.g. UL 72 Class 350, EN 15659 LFS; what ratings mean), rated for paper, but metal is still preferable; one fire/flood hits home copies together |
| Hidden spot at home | Cheap, discreet | Forgotten, renovated, thrown out; house sold |
| Bank or private safe deposit box | Strong physical security, off-site | Many UK banks have withdrawn boxes; access may freeze on death until probate; contents usually uninsured (UK and US details) |
| Trusted family / friend | Geographic separation; helps inheritance | Relationship changes; they may be targeted; only give a share or one multisig key |
| Solicitor / professional | Formal, durable, part of estate plan | Must never hold a complete single-sig seed; firms merge or close |
| Buried / remote cache | Very discreet | Damp, construction, forgetting the spot, access for heirs |
| Second property / office | Separation | Colleagues, cleaners, landlords |
Use tamper-evident bags (numbered security bags) around off-site backups and record the serial numbers: on each check you can tell whether anyone opened it.
Safe deposit boxes in the UK and US Intermediate
United Kingdom: a shrinking service
- Most high-street banks have closed their services. Barclays has closed Barclaysafe and is returning stored items (Barclays). NatWest and RBS say they have "made the difficult decision" to close Safe Custody (NatWest, RBS). Bank of Scotland closed Safe Custody to new items in 2001 and points customers to a Lloyds safe deposit box product (Bank of Scotland). In 2016 the Sunday Times reported that HSBC was phasing out closed safe keeping, with 30 days' notice to collect items (The Times).
- Some providers remain. Metro Bank offers boxes in most of its stores to customers who hold a Metro Bank account. Its published prices in October 2026 ran from £255 a year (extra small) to £801 a year (extra large), and it suggests insuring the contents yourself (Metro Bank). Prices and availability change; check directly.
- On death: Bank of Scotland, for example, returns Safe Custody items to the executor and needs a grant of probate if the items are valuable. Expect a delay before anyone can reach a box after a death. See the UK estate guide.
United States: not insured, and state law decides access
- Not FDIC-insured. The FDIC says a safe deposit box "is not a deposit account", so its contents are not covered by deposit insurance, and banks generally do not insure contents either. It suggests asking your home or renter's insurer about cover (FDIC).
- Access on death depends on state law, which "restrict[s] entry … to certain individuals" under controlled conditions (FDIC). Joint renters get unrestricted access, and the bank is unlikely to be responsible for what they remove.
- Unpaid boxes can pass to the state. If fees go unpaid, a box is typically treated as dormant after three to five years (set by state statute). Its contents may then be sent to the state's unclaimed-property office, a process called escheat (OCC HelpWithMyBank, NAUPA). A metal plate with words on it may mean nothing to the person cataloguing it.
- Private vaults carry their own risks. In 2021 the FBI seized boxes at US Private Vaults in Beverly Hills while investigating the business. In January 2024 the Ninth Circuit held that the FBI's "inventory" of about 700 boxes exceeded the warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment (Snitko v. United States). Box holders' property was caught up in an investigation of someone else.
Pros
- Strong physical security, off-site
- Natural "second location" for one share or one multisig key
Cons
- Opening hours; not reachable in an emergency
- Contents usually uninsured
- Staff and investigators can, in some circumstances, open boxes
Pitfalls
- A complete single-sig seed in a box: anyone who opens the box can take everything
- Letting the fee lapse (US escheat)
- Keeping the box number and bank name on the key ring (the FDIC warns against this)
- Heirs who don't know the box exists
Community advice
- Use a box for part of a scheme (one SLIP-39 share, one multisig key, or a passphrase copy), never the whole secret
- Seal the contents in a numbered tamper-evident bag
- Record the box in your letter of instruction
Location strategy and geographic separation Intermediate
Lopp's rule of thumb: if any single location holds enough to steal the funds, it is a single point of failure, and no single disaster should be able to destroy copies in several places at once. But don't spread things so widely that you never check them. A patient attacker could compromise backups one by one over years (Lopp).
| Layout | Items | Sites | Survives losing any one site? | Thief at any one site gets the funds? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single seed, one copy | 1 plate | 1 | No | Yes |
| Single seed, two copies | 2 plates | 2 | Yes | Yes, at either site |
| Seed + passphrase, one of each | 1 plate + 1 passphrase | 2 | No: lose either and the funds are gone | No |
| Seed + passphrase, two of each, never together | 2 + 2 | 4 | Yes | No |
| SLIP-39 2-of-3 | 3 share plates | 3 | Yes | No |
| Multisig 2-of-3 (plus descriptor copies) | 3 seed plates + 3 descriptor copies | 3 | Yes | No (and it also protects against a compromised device) |
The layouts follow from how each scheme works. See SLIP-39 vs multisig and the expert section below.
Choosing sites
- Different risks, not just different addresses. Two houses on the same flood plain, or the same street in a wildfire area, share a disaster.
- Reachable within a day or two. You need to check them, and your heirs need to collect them.
- People you trust, holding only a part. A relative or friend can hold one share or one multisig key, sealed and labelled "do not open, contact X". Never a whole single-sig seed.
- Professionals for documents, not secrets. A solicitor or attorney can hold your will and letter of instruction; see custody & services.
- Privacy. Don't tell people how much you hold or what the sealed packet is; avoid deliveries of backup products to the storage address.
Checking and maintaining stored backups Intermediate
- Day one: verify each copy with your wallet's built-in check (for example "Check backup" on Trezor, or a dry-run recovery on devices that offer one), reading from the stored copy, not from your notes.
- Seal and log: put each copy in a numbered tamper-evident bag. Photograph the outside of the sealed bag only and record the serial number in your inventory. Lopp suggests signing the bag too.
- Yearly: inspect each bag for tampering. Check paper copies for fading or damp, and metal for corrosion. Make sure each location still exists and is still accessible.
- After any event (burglary, flood, a move, a relationship ending, a bank closing its box service): treat the affected copy as possibly compromised. If a whole secret might have been seen, move the funds to a new wallet.
- Every few years: do a full test restore with a small amount, update your letter of instruction, and confirm the wallet software can still read your format.
Pros, cons, pitfalls and community advice: summary Beginner Intermediate
What works
- One-piece stainless or titanium plates with punched or stamped data
- At least two copies in places that do not share a disaster
- Verification with the device, then sealed, logged storage
- Splitting schemes for larger sums
Trade-offs
- Every extra copy is another target
- Metal costs money and punched mistakes are permanent
- Splitting schemes add complexity for you and your heirs
Most common pitfalls
- Keeping the only copy in the same drawer as the hardware wallet
- Tile cassettes stored as the only metal copy
- Home-made "encryption" or word shuffling (why not)
- Never testing the backup
- Nobody else knowing the backup exists
Community advice
- "Do not rely upon the wisdom of the crowd": Lopp says at least 95% of answers in typical forum threads he saw had single points of failure (Lopp)
- Plan for what your holdings could be worth in ten years, not what they are worth today (Lopp)
- Back up the wallet details as well: the wallet type, derivation path and, for multisig, the descriptor
Expert: combining metal with passphrases, SLIP-39 and multisig Expert
Physical storage and secret-splitting solve different problems. Metal protects against destruction; splitting protects against discovery. The art is to get both without creating a scheme you or your heirs cannot operate.
BIP39 passphrase
- A passphrase makes a found seed plate useless on its own. Lopp warns that this is effectively a 2-of-2 arrangement with two single points of failure, and that he has seen many people locked out by a lost passphrase (Lopp).
- So the passphrase needs its own durable, redundant backup, never stored with the seed. As the layout table shows, that means four items across four sites to survive the loss of any one site without ever keeping the seed and passphrase together.
- Stamp the passphrase exactly, including capitals, spaces and symbols. Some makers sell separate passphrase plates (Lopp graded the Coldbit Passphrase plate A−).
SLIP-39 (Shamir) shares
- Each share is a separate 20-word list. Trezor's Keep Metal Multi-share has a section to record the total number of shares and the threshold, and each share needs its own capsule (Trezor, setup guide).
- A 2-of-3 layout puts one share plate in each of three sites. Losing one site loses nothing; finding one share reveals nothing useful (per the SLIP-39 specification).
- Record the scheme on every plate ("share 2 of 3, threshold 2") and write down which wallets can restore SLIP-39. BIP39-only wallets cannot (see SLIP-39).
Multisig
- Back up each key's seed on metal and store them in different sites. Also keep a copy of the wallet descriptor (or the xpubs, derivation paths and threshold) with every seed backup. Lopp suggests keeping it inside the same tamper-evident bag: it cannot spend funds on its own, but without it recovery can become a "treasure hunt" (Lopp). The descriptor does reveal your balances and history, so treat it as private.
- Consider different metal products or formats for different keys, so that one design flaw cannot affect every copy.
- See multisig and the 10x Security Bitcoin Guide.
Seed XOR and other N-of-N splits
Seed XOR splits a seed into parts that are each valid-looking seeds, but you need all of them. Lopp notes you will want multiple sets so that losing one plate is not catastrophic (Lopp, seedxor.com). See Seed XOR.
Real-world incidents Intermediate
These are sourced reports relevant to physical storage. More are in the case files. We found no published, independently verified case of a correctly made A-grade metal backup being destroyed by a house fire, and none is claimed here.
| Incident | What happened | Lesson |
|---|---|---|
| California wildfires, January 2025 | CNBC reported social media claims of bitcoin losses after the fires, including photos of burnt, unreadable metal seed plates and difficulties reaching keys in a bank safe deposit box affected by the fires. CNBC noted the individual claims could not be verified (CNBC). Casa's chief executive said a customer who lost a seed phrase in a fire recovered using the other keys of a multisig setup (Bitcoin.com News; Casa sells that service). | Wildfires burn whole neighbourhoods: separate sites by distance and risk. Redundancy, not just tougher material, is what saved the multisig user. |
| Paper backups lost to floods and fires | Owners have described flood-ruined paper wallets and paper backups lost with the device in house fires (threads above). | Paper alone is not a long-term backup. |
| US Private Vaults raid, 2021 | The FBI seized and "inventoried" about 700 boxes at a private vault company it was investigating; in 2024 the Ninth Circuit held this violated the Fourth Amendment (Snitko v. United States). | A box can be opened for reasons that have nothing to do with you. Store only part of a secret in any box. |
| Hatton Garden Safe Deposit burglary, 2015 (general) | A gang broke into a London safe deposit vault over Easter 2015 and took about £14m of property; the judge said the burglary "stands in a class of its own" (BBC). | Vaults are strong, not invulnerable. Tamper-evident bags tell you whether a backup has been seen. |
Physical storage checklist Beginner
- Metal copy made from stainless steel or titanium, with punched or stamped characters
- Each copy verified with the device, reading from the stored copy
- At least two copies in places that don't share a fire, flood or burglar, or a splitting scheme
- No single location holds enough to steal the funds (for larger sums)
- Passphrase, if used, backed up as durably as the seed, and never stored with it
- Wallet details (type, derivation path, descriptor) recorded alongside
- Tamper-evident bags; serial numbers logged
- Bank or vault box fees paid; box recorded for your executor
- A yearly inspection date in your calendar
- Letter of instruction updated, explaining where things are, without any secrets
Printable versions: backup checklist and inventory template.
Last reviewed: · Educational information only — verify current details with official sources.