Wallets & devices

A hardware wallet keeps keys off your internet-connected computer and asks you to confirm every transaction on its own screen. Here is how the main devices compare on the features that matter for backup, how their security models differ, what has gone wrong with each, and how to set one up and verify it.

At a glance Beginner

• A hardware wallet is a signing device, not a vault for your coins. The coins live on the blockchain. The device holds the private keys and signs transactions; the seed phrase is the real backup.
• If the device is lost, broken or stolen, the seed restores everything on a new device, from the same or a compatible maker. If the seed is lost and the device fails, the funds are gone.
• If someone else sees your seed, the device cannot help you. No hardware wallet maker, support agent or "validation" tool will ever need your words. Every recorded Ledger and Trezor phishing campaign below asked for them.
• Buy new, from the maker or a listed reseller, and set it up yourself. Never accept a device that arrives with words already printed or filled in.
• Read the address and amount on the device's own screen before you approve. Malware on the computer can change what the computer shows, but not what a genuine device displays.
• Test a recovery with a small amount before you move savings, and update firmware only through the maker's official app.

What a hardware wallet protects against — and what it does not Beginner

Sources: case files and the advisories table below.

Cold vs hot, in plain terms Beginner

What to look for Beginner

• Secure element (SE): tamper-resistant chip that makes physical key extraction much harder.
• Open source: firmware others can audit. Some devices are partly open (apps open, OS closed).
• Air-gap: communicates by QR code or microSD rather than USB/Bluetooth — reduces attack surface.
• Passphrase support and backup standard (BIP39 vs SLIP-39).
• Screen you can read transactions on — avoid "blind signing".
• Coins you need: Bitcoin-only devices have smaller codebases; multi-coin devices support more chains.

Comparison table Intermediate

Official sites: trezor.io · ledger.com · coldcard.com · keyst.one · bitbox.swiss · foundation.xyz · blockstream.com/jade · seedsigner.com · onekey.so · ngrave.io · tangem.com · bitkey.world

Detailed comparison matrix Intermediate

This matrix lists only what makers' documentation or independent research confirmed when we checked in October 2026. "Not documented" means we did not find the feature in official documentation; it may still exist, so check with the maker. It is not a ranking, and no maker paid to appear.

We did not check shipping, VAT or import duty for each maker. UK buyers ordering from outside the UK may pay import VAT and handling fees. Reproducible builds let anyone rebuild the published source and compare it to the firmware the maker ships; WalletScrutiny records independent attempts version by version, and results can differ between releases. See also the directory and how each device makes randomness.

Device-by-device evidence Intermediate

Trezor (SatoshiLabs)

Ledger

COLDCARD (Coinkite)

Keystone, BitBox02, Passport, Jade, SeedSigner, Tangem, Bitkey

Security models compared Intermediate

Open versus closed firmware

Open-source firmware lets anyone read the code, but you only benefit if the firmware on your device matches it. That is what reproducible builds and maker signatures are for. Ledger states that its agreement with STMicroelectronics prevents it from publishing the low-level code that talks to the secure element, while its apps, crypto library and parts of the OS are published (Ledger; BOLOS public sources). COLDCARD publishes its source under MIT plus the Commons Clause, which restricts selling products built on it, so it is source-available rather than open source in the OSI sense (licence).

The 2023 Ledger Recover controversy

In May 2023 Ledger announced Recover, an optional paid service that encrypts and splits the seed into three shares held by Ledger, Coincover and EscrowTech. Critics pointed out that it showed the device firmware could export the seed (in encrypted form) if Ledger signed an update to do so; Ledger postponed the launch after the backlash (CoinDesk). In June 2023 Ledger published the Recover protocol white paper (Ledger; GitHub), and later the Recover entry points in its public OS sources. The lesson applies to every maker: a signed firmware update can change what a device does, so who you trust to sign updates matters. More on the service itself: seed recovery services.

Supply chain, fake devices and phishing

• Counterfeit Trezor (published May 2023): Kaspersky examined a "Trezor Model T" bought through a classifieds website. It had a different chip soldered in, protections removed, and firmware that swapped the random seed for one of 20 pre-generated seeds and cut any passphrase to its first character — about 1,280 possibilities in total. Trezor said the case was over a year old (Kaspersky).
• Tampered "replacement" Ledgers by post (2021): criminals used addresses from the 2020 Ledger data leak to post modified Nano X devices (case).
• Ledger data leak (2020): about 1 million email addresses and 272,000 names and postal addresses, followed by years of phishing (Ledger).
• Trezor support portal (January 2024): unauthorised access to a third-party support system exposed names and emails of up to 66,000 people who had contacted support since December 2021; the attacker emailed 41 users asking for their recovery seeds (Trezor; BleepingComputer).
• Ledger Connect Kit (14 December 2023): a phished former employee's NPM access let attackers publish malicious versions 1.1.5–1.1.7 for about five hours; Ledger estimated assets were actively drained for under two hours (Ledger report).
• Malicious firmware (Dark Skippy, August 2024): researchers showed that a corrupted signer could leak a 12-word seed through as few as two signatures, undetectably. It is a method, not a known attack in the wild, and genuine devices with honest firmware do not do it (disclosure; FAQ).

Known vulnerabilities and advisories Intermediate

A selection of well-documented findings. "Physical" means the attacker needs your device in hand, usually with lab equipment. Dates are disclosure dates. Weak-randomness incidents, including Coinkite's July 2026 COLDCARD seed-generation advisory, are covered on the randomness page rather than repeated here.

Air-gapped signing & PSBT Expert

Bitcoin's Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction format (BIP-174) lets an online "coordinator" (Sparrow, Nunchuk, Electrum) build a transaction, pass it by QR or microSD to an offline signer, and receive the signature back. The keys never touch a connected device.

• Verify the destination address and amount on the signer's screen, not just the computer.
• For multisig, register the wallet descriptor on each signer so it can verify change addresses.
• Vendor diversity (e.g. Trezor + COLDCARD + BitBox) limits the impact of any single firmware or RNG flaw.

Setup, verification and pitfalls checklist Beginner Intermediate

1. Buy new from the maker or a listed reseller. Keep the order confirmation. Do not buy second-hand or from marketplaces.
2. Inspect the packaging, but do not rely on seals alone.
3. Download the companion app only from the maker's site and verify it where the maker explains how (Trezor example).
4. Run the authenticity check in the official app (Trezor; Ledger checks that a device is genuine when it connects to Ledger's app (Ledger)). Stop if it fails.
5. Create a new seed on the device (or with dice where supported). Reject any device that shows words you did not just generate, or any pre-filled card.
6. Write the words by hand on the supplied card, then copy to metal. No photos, no cloud notes, no printers (physical storage).
7. Record the wallet's fingerprint and, if you use one, the fact that a passphrase exists — not the passphrase itself in the same place.
8. Test recovery: send a small amount, wipe or use a second device, restore from your backup, and check you see the same addresses.
9. Check every receive address on the device screen before sharing it, and every send on the device before approving.
10. Update firmware only via the official app, after reading the release notes. Have your backup to hand but never type it into the computer.
11. Set a PIN you can remember and know the wipe limit.
12. Write instructions for your family (see templates) and record the checks above on the setup and verification log.

Common pitfalls and community advice

Multisig across vendors Expert

A 2-of-3 multisig with devices from three different makers means a single firmware bug, RNG flaw, supply-chain attack or maker going out of business cannot cost you your funds on its own. The coordinator (for example Sparrow, Nunchuk, Specter or Liana) builds transactions; each device verifies and signs.

Setup procedures such as BSMS (BIP-129) exist to exchange keys safely; see the coordinator directory and custody models.

Verifying firmware Expert

• Signature checks (all major makers): devices refuse, or loudly warn about, firmware not signed by the maker. Never ignore the warning.
• Firmware hash check: Trezor Suite compares the device's firmware hash with the expected value (Trezor); BitBox02 can show its firmware hash before boot (BitBox).
• Reproducible builds: rebuild the tagged release and compare it with the published binary — COLDCARD (repro make target), Jade (REPRODUCIBLE.md), BitBox02, Keystone (verify.md) and Passport Prime (KeyOS). Jade's guide warns not to flash your own build onto official hardware.
• What a build check does not prove: a reproducible build ties the binary to the source, not the source to good randomness. See verifying entropy claims.
• Independent records: WalletScrutiny publishes per-version results, so check the version you are actually running.
• Anti-exfil signing: a protocol in which the computer adds randomness to each signature, so a malicious device cannot hide your seed in it. Jade and BitBox02 implement it (Blockstream; BitBox). It is the main defence proposed against Dark Skippy-style attacks.

Descriptor and wallet-configuration backups Expert

An output descriptor (BIP-380) records the script type, derivation paths and every participant's extended public key. For single-signature wallets on standard paths, the seed is usually enough. For multisig, the descriptor is essential: without it you may hold enough seeds but not know the other public keys or the script.

• Store a copy of the descriptor with each seed or share. It reveals your balances and history but cannot spend funds.
• Print it as text or QR; do not rely only on a microSD card or a laptop.
• Record the threshold (for example 2-of-3), device models and firmware versions used at setup.
• Re-check the descriptor after adding or replacing a key.
• What an heir needs, and why losing the descriptor can turn "any 2 of 3" into "all 3": see multisig recovery.

Software wallets (briefly) Beginner

Desktop coordinators like Sparrow and Electrum are excellent when paired with hardware. Mobile/browser hot wallets (BlueWallet, MetaMask, Rabby) are fine for spending money. Pitfalls: phone cloud backups (MetaMask iCloud warning), malicious look-alike apps, and wallets that logged seeds to servers (the 2022 Slope wallet incident).

MPC and smart-contract wallets Expert

Seed recovery services (e.g. Ledger Recover) Intermediate

Ledger Recover is optional and paid: your device encrypts and splits seed entropy into three shares held by Ledger, Coincover and EscrowTech; any two plus identity verification restore your seed (Ledger FAQ).

Hardware wallet checklist Beginner

• Bought new from the maker or a listed reseller.
• Authenticity check passed in the official app.
• Seed generated on the device during setup; written by hand; copied to metal; stored away from the device.
• Recovery tested with a small amount.
• Passphrase (if used) backed up separately and tested.
• Multisig: descriptor stored with every key.
• Firmware and apps up to date; maker's security page checked recently.
• Family or executor know the plan exists and where to find instructions.

Last reviewed: 23 October 2026 · Educational information only — verify current details with official sources.